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had a right of priority to payment out of
the current earnings of the road in the
hands of the receivor, and that if such
earnings had already been diverted frojn
that purpose and employed in the payment of
theinterest on the mortgage bonds, pursuant
to orders of the court below, then that such
claims should be paid out of the proceeds of
the sal e of the road, before such proceeds
should be applied to the payment of the
mortgage debt. Fosdick v. Schall, 98 U. S.
225; Hall v. Frost, 98 U. S. 389; Atlegus v.
Petersburg R. Co., 3 Hughes, 313; Owen v.
Harman, 4 H. L. 997; Beverly v. Brook, 4
Grat. 187 ; Syracuse City Bank v. Tollnap, 31
Barb. 208; Douglas v. Cline, 12 Bush, 608;
Duncan v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 3 Cent.
L. J. 579; Clark v. Willinasport, etc. R. Co.,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and Poland
v. La Motte Valey R. Co., Supreme Court of
Vermont, not yet.reported. See, also, upon
this subject, 2 Cent. L. J. 636; 3 lb. 304,
338, and 4 lb. 458.
LITERARY PROPERTY.
At common law, the author of an unpub-"
lished manuscript had a property in his
production, which continued in him until
publication by his consent. But the question
of what rights an author possessed in his lit-
erary productions, independent of any statu-
tory provisions upon the subject, was for a
long time a topic of excited discussion among
literary men, and one of much interest to the
legal profession, it'being a subject of much
litigation in the courts. The first determina-
tion which the subject received in the court of
King's Bench, was in the famous case of Mil-
lar v. Taylor t decided in 1769. It was held
by the court that while at common law an
author had the sole right of first printing and
publishing for sale his writings, yet after such
publication made by him, he possessed no
property rights in his production, which could
be infringed by a republication by a stranger,
unless the author had taken out a copyright
under some statute giving him such right.
In 1774, the question was brought iito the
1 4 Burr. 2303.
House of Lords in the case of Donaldson v.
Becket.2 That case involved the considera-
tion of several interesting questions.
1. The first of these was, whether at com-
mon law, an author of any book or literary
composition had the sole right of first printing
and publishing the same for sale; and whether
he might bring an action against any person
who printed, published or sold the same with-
out his consent. These propositions were
sustained, eight of 'he judges voting in the
affirmative, and three in the negative.
2. If the author had such right originally,.
did the law take it away upon the printing
and publishing of such book or literary com-
position, against the will of the author? This-
was answered in the negative by seven of the
judges, and by four in the affirmative.
3. If such action would have lain at com-
mon law, was it taken away by statute of 8
Anne (statute of copyright), and is an author
by said statute precluded from every remedy
except on the foundation of said statute, and
on the conditions prescribed therein? Six of'
the judges answered in the affirmative, and
five in the negative.
4. Whether the author of any literary com-
position, and his assigns, had the sole right
of printing and publishing the same in perpe-
tuity by the common law. Seven of the
judges answered affirmatively, and four neg-
atively.
5. Whether this right of publication in per-
petuity was taken away by the statute of
copyright. Six answered in the affirmative,
and five in the negative.
Notwithstanding the answer of the judges
to the fourth of the above propositions, as to
the author's peipetual and exclusive property
right at common law, in the future publica-
tions of his work,.after having once published
the same, the subject has since been seriously
questioned, both in England and in this coun-
try, the Supreme Court of the United States
saying in Wheaton v. Peters, 3 that it could
not be considered as free from doubt, but
evidently inclining to the opinion that he had
no such right. But no doubt exists as to the
Yact that an author did possess, by the e(m-
mon law, a properly-right in his unpublished
manuscripts. 4 And it may also be considered
2 4 Burr. 2408.
3 8 Peters. 591,657, (1834).
4 Wheaton v. 'eters, 8 Pet. 591; French v. Maguire,
HeinOnline  -- 12 Cent. L.J. 311 1881
CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. 339
as es:ablished beyond nll controversy, that
when the author has once published his
writings, he loses his private rights therein,
and they become common property,and suhject
to the free use of the po blic,--in other words,
that copyright exists only by statute.5 The
first English statute which secured to an
author the rights of literary property after
publication, was 8 Anne, c. 19, which gave
him the sole right of publication for twenty-
one years. The present English copyrigt
act is, we believe, the one passed in 1842. In
this country, the framers of the Federal Con-
stitution provided that Congress should have
power "to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, by securing for limited times,
to authors and inventors, the exclusive right
to their respective writings and di-coveries."
In pursultnce of this power, Congress, in 1790,
passed our first copyright act. In 1870 the
present act was passed, and an author has ex-
clusive right to the publication of his writings
for twenty-eight year's from the time of taking
out his copyright, with a right of renewal for
fourteen years at the expiration of the first
period.
Inasmuch as an author's rights in his man-
uscript or writings are lost at common law by
publication, it is interesting to note the opin-
ion that a publication of a work for private
purposes and for private circulation, is not
such a publication as defeats the common-law
right of property. 6 So one who permits his
pupils to take copies of his manuscripts for
the purpose of instructing themselves and
others, does not thereby abandon them to the
public, and if an attempt is made to publish
them, their publication will be restrained by
inj unction.7
In Crowe v. Aiken," Judge Drummond de-
clares that the delivery of a lecture is not such
a publication of it as deprives the lecturer of
his property rights therein. It can not be
true, he says, that the lecturer has no rights
55 How. Pr. 471; Boucicault v. Fox, 3 Blackf. 88, 97;
Parton v. Prang, 3 Clifford, 537; Rees v. Peltzer, 75
Il1. 475.
5Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. 838; Reade v. Con-
quest, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 768; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet.
691; Rees v. Peltzer, 75111. 475, 478; Parton v. Prang,
3 Clifford, 537.
6 See White v. Geroch, 2 B. & Ald. 298; Prince Al-
bert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 686; Copniger on
Copyright, 9.
7 Bartlett v. Crittenden, 4 McLean, 300.
8 2 Bissell, 208.
of property in his unpublished and unprinted
lecture; that the clergyman has no rights of
property in his unpublished sermon, the work
of weeks of thought and labor, simply because
he has repeated it to an audience. In Keene
v. Kimball, 9 decided by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, the court disclaimed any iii-
tention of intimating that there was any right
to report phonographically or otherwise, a
lecture which its author had delivered before
a public audience, and which he desired to
use again in like manner, and to publish it
without his consQnt, or to make any use of a
copy thus obtained. "The student who at-
tends a medical lecture," stiy the court,"
"may have a perfect right to remember as
much as lie can, and afterward to use the in-
formation thus acquired in his own medical
practice, or to communicate it to students or
classes of his own, Without involving the right
to commit the lecture to writing, for the pur-
pose of subsequent publication in print or by
oral delivery. So, any one of the audience
at a concert or opera, may play a tune which
his ear has enabled 'him to catch, or sing a
song which he may carry away in his memory,
for his own entertainment or that of others,
for compensation or gratuitously, while he
would have no right to copy or publish the
musical composition. " In Palmer v. DeWitt,'10
it is said that the delivery of a lecture in the
presence of a public audience is not such a
dedication of it to the public use, that it can
be printed and published without the lecturer's
permission. "It does not give to the hearer
any title to the manuscript, or a copy of it,
or a right to the use of a copy of it. The
manuscript and the right of the author there-
in are still within the protection of the law,
the same as if they had never been communi-
cated to the public in any form." In England
the right of property in lectures has been con-
firmed by statute, which provides that no per-
son, allowed for a certain fee to be present at
any lecture delivered at any place, shall be
deemed to be licensed to publish such lecture
on account of having been permitted to attend
the lecture, but that the sole right of publica-
tion shall be in the author.11,
9 16 Gray, 545, 551.
10 47 N. Y. 542.
115 & 6Will. iv, c. 65. And that the delivery of a
lecture to an audience admitted on payment of a fee
is not a "publication" of the lecture. See Abernethy
v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J., Ch. 209.
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So the public representation of a dramatic
play is not such a publication of it, as author-
izes anyone to print it without respect to the
property rights of the owner. In Macklin v.
Richardson, 12 as long ago as 1770, an injunc-
tion was issued restraining the publication in
a magazine of a farce which had been acted,
but never printed. The mere performance of
a play in a public theater, with the consent of
the author, for a compensation to him, is no
evidence of his abandonment of the manu-
script to the use of the public. 13 The fact
that the author has withheld it from publica-
tion, entitles him to an injunction on princi-
ples of literary property, against one who
publishes it without his consent, although
represented in public without having been
copyrighted. 14  In Crowe v. Aiken, 15 the,
court say that at- common law the representa-
tion of a play upon the stage is not a dedica-'
tion of it to the public, except so far as those
who witness its performance can recollect it;
nor have the spectators the right to secure its
reproduction by phonographic or other means
independent of memory; and that iio restrict-
ive notice is necessary to spectators to secure
the author's rights, nor will such notice give'
him a right which he does not have at coin-
mon law.
But a distinction exists between the right
to publish a play, and the right to represent it
upon the stage. In reference to this, the
New York Court of Appeals says: "The right
publicly to represent a dramatic composition
for profit, and the right to print and publish
the same composition to the exclusion of
others, are entirely distinct, aid the one may
exist without the other. The copyright acts
which secured to authors the exclusive right,
for a limited time, to print and publish their
works, did not secure to them the exclusive
right of the public representation of their dra-
matic compositions. Until tl~e passage in
England of statutes 3 and 4 William IV., ch.
15, an author could not prevent anyone from
publicly performing on the stage any drama
in which the author possessed the copyright.
He could only prevent the publication of his
work by multiplication of copies of it."16
12 Ambler, 694.
13 Boi1cieault v. Fox, 3 Blatchford, 88.
14 Boucicault v. Hart, 13 Blatchford, 47.
15 2 Bissell, 208.
16 Palmt" v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532.
This same right was secured to the author in
this country, by act of Congress passed in
1856. Hence we find in French v. Maguire,
17
the court saying that the public performance
of a dramatic composition" will permit the ob-
server or hearer to appropriate for himself so
much as his memory may be capable of retain-
ing. But it will not allow the hearer and ob-
server to appropriate and use the entire
composition, with its incidental stage accom-
paniments. That right still remains in the
author and his assignee. In this case, the
court granted an injunction against a non-
resident defendant, temporarily within the
State when process was served, restraining
him from performing or exhibiting a drama in
a foreign State, in violation of the complain-
ant's rights. In Daly v. Palmer,' 8 it is held
that the various parts which go to make up a
"scene" in a theatrical representation, con-
sisting of gestures, spoken words, etc., con-
stitute a dramatic composition entitled to
protection, and a person is chargeable with
infringement if the appropriated scenes of
events, when represented on tht. stage, al-
though performed by new and different char-
acters, using different language, are recognized
by the spectator through the inedium of the
senses, as conveying substantially the same
emotions in the same sequence or order as the
original.
In Keene v. Kimball, 19 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts declare that the representa-
tion of a dramatic work, which the proprietor
has no copyright of, and has previously
caused to be represented and exhibited for
money, is no violation of any right of prop-
erty, although made without license of the
proprietor. This is in harmony with the con-
clusion of the New York Court of Appeals in
Palmer v. De Witt, already cited. But Keene's
case is worthy of attention for the ingenious
argument which counsel advanced to show
that a dramatic composition was not entitled,
in Massachusetts, to the protection accorded
to literary property. In reference to this the
court said: "Notwithstanding the ingenious
and interesting argument for the defendant,
derived from the principles and ideas of the
Puritan founders of the Commonwealth, we
17 55 How. Pr. 471.
Is 6 Blatchford, 256.
19 16 Gray, 545.
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can entertain no doubt that a dramatic com-
position is equally under the protection of the
law with any other literary work. Courts will
not interfere to vindicate the claims of any
party to the exclusive enjoyment or disposal
of an immoral or licentious production; but
the particular application once made of this
rule of the common law in conformity with
the peculiar opinions, sentiments or prejudices
of one generation of men, will not control its
application in a state of society where differ-
ent views prevail. If our ancestors prohibited
all scenic exhibitions, it was because they re-•.
garded them as immoral and pernicious. If
we do not so regard them, the reason ceasing,
the rule ceases with it."
In the case of Boucicault v. Fox,20 it is
said that a person who agrees to write a play
to be acted at the theater of another person,
and who agrees to act in the play himself, so
long as it will run, receiving a share of the
profits as a compensation, does not thereby
confer upon any one the legal or equitable
title to the play, and he is entitled to take out
copyright for it after it has been so acted in
such theater. But in England, by the statute
of 5 & 6 Victoria, ch. 45, sec. 20, the repre-
sentation upon the stage of a dramatic piece,
is declared to be equivalent to publication,
and defeats all claim of the author to copy-
right.
We now pass to a consideration of the right
of property in letters. Cicero speaks of the
publication of private letters as being a gross
offense against common decency. 2 1 Not only
is it an offense against common decency, but
it is an offense against the law, being a viola-
tion of the writer's rights therein. This sub-
ject was very fully considered by Mr. Justice
Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 22 and the following
quotation from his decision is of such interest,
and states the law so fully and satisfactorily,
that its length may well be pardoned. "The
author of any letter or letters," says Judge
Story (and his representatives), "whether
203 Blatchford, 88.
21 Quis cuirn unquam, qui paulum modo bonorum
consuetudinem nosset, literas, adse ab ainico ilnissas,
offensioue aliqua interposita, in medium protulit,
palainque recitavit? Quid est aliud. tollere e vita
Societatem, qatian tollere anieioru in colloquia abseuti-
uM? Q1ailn ilulta joca SOIIezt eSse i) el)iStolis, utia,
prolata si sint, inepta videantuil Qaii niulta stria,
neque tanien llo miodo divulganda! Orat. Philip.
ii., c. 4.
22 2 Story, 100, 110.
they are literary compositions, or familiar
letters, or letters of business, possess the sole
and exclusive copyright therein; and no per-
sons, neither those to whom they are ad-
dressed, nor other persons, have any right or
authority to publish the same upon their own
account, or for their own benefit. But, con-
sistently with this right, the persons to whom
they are addressed may have, nay, must by
implication possess, the right to publish any
letter or letters addressed to them, upon such
occasions, as require or justify the publica-
tion or public use of them; but this right is
strictly limited to such occasions. Thus, a
person may justifiably use and publish, in a
suit at law or in equity, such letter or letters
as are necessary and proper to establish his
right to maintain the suit or defend the same.
So, if he be aspersed or misrepresented by
the writer, or accused of improper conduct
in a public manner, he may publish such parts
of such letter or letters, but no more, as may
be necessary to vindicate his character and
reputation, or free him from unjust obloquy
and reproach. If he attempt to publish such
letter or letters on other occasions, not justi-
fiable, a court of equity will prevent the pub-
lication by an injunction, as a breach of
private confidence or contract, but it is a vio-
lation of the exclusive copyright of the
writer. In short, the person to whom letters
are addressed, has but a limited right or
special property in such letters, as a trustee,
or bailee, for particular purposes, either of
information or of protection, or of support
of his own rights and character. The gene-
ral prbpcrty, and the general rights incident
to property, belong to the writer, whether the
letters, are literary compositions or familiar
letters, or details of facts, or letters of busi-
ness. The general property in the manu-
scripts remains in the writer and his repre-
sentatives, as well as the general copyright."
There is no doubt that letters may be pro-
duced in court. to vindicate the rights of the
person who received them, 23 and the neces-
sity of vindicating one's character is a com-
plete justification of their publication.2 '1 But
the government, it seems, has a right to pub-
lish or to withhold all letters addressed to the
public offices.2 5
23 See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 403.
24 Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Ducr, 379.
25,Fosusoi v. blar~h, 2 Story, 100.
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Is a fair, bona fide abridgment of an
original work to be regarded as a piracy of
the copyright of the author? In Newberry's
Case, 26 decided in 1774, an injunction, was
asked to restrain the publication of an
abridgment; but Lord Chancellor Apsley was
of the opinion that an abridgment was not
any violation of the author's property rights.
The act of abridgment was, in his judgment,
an act of the understanding employed in car-
rying a larger work into a smaller compass,
and rendering it less expensive and more con-
venient-an abridgment being in the nature
of a new and meritorious work. Lord Hard-
wicke, in Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 7 stated the rule
as follows; "Where books are colourably
shortened only, they are undoubtedly within
the meaning of the Act of Parliament, and
are a mere. invasion of the statute, and can
not be called an abridgment. But this must
not be carried so far as to restrain persons
from making a real and fair abridgment; for
an abridgment may, with great propriety, be
called a new book, because not only the
paper and print, but the invention, learning
and judgment of the author is shown in them,
and in many cases they are extremely use-
ful." That a bona fide abridgment does not
violate the rights of the author of the origi-
nal work, seems to be no longer disputed.
28
But to constitute an infringement, it is not
necessary that the larger part of a work pro-
tected by copyright should be appropriated.
If so much is taken that the value of the
original work is diminished materially, or the
labors of the author are appropriated to an
injurious extent, such appropriation amounts
to an invasion of the copyright.2 9  And
where A published a life of Washington, con-
taining 866 pages, of which 353 pages were
copied from Sparks' Life and Writings of
Washington, sixty-four pages being official
letters and documents, and 255 pages being
private letters of Washington. originally pub-
lished by Mr. Sparks under a contract with
the owners of the original papers of Wash-
ington, the court held the work to be an in-
vasion of the copyright of Mr. Sparks, as it
28 Lofft, 775.
27 2 At k. 141.
28 Dodsley v. Kinnerley, Ambler 403; Whitting-
hani v. Wooler, 2 Swanst. 428, 430; Tonson v. Walker,
3 Swanst. 672.
29 Greene v. Bishop, I Clifford, 186, 200.
sensibly diminished the value of the original
work.30 It is useless, however, to refer to,
any particular cases as to. quantity, as the
question of infringement does not necessarily
turn upon the quantity taken, but upon the
value of that which is appropriated. 3' The
principle has been well stated by Copinger,
an English writer as follows: "The general
principle is that the proper object of the
copyright is the peculiar expression of the
author's ideas, meaning by this, the structure
of the work, the sequence of his remarks,
and, above all, his language. * * * *
If this view be correct,, it follows that any
abridgment of the work in the original
author's language, is an infringement of his
right; and, indeed, any quotation will be pra
tanto a violation, unless excused on the
ground of its inconsiderable extent." 32 A
clear distinction exists between an abridg-
ment and a compilation. An abridgment, it
is said, necessarily adopts the same arrange-
ment and conveys the same knowledge in a,
condensed form, but a compiler can neither
adopt the arrangement, nor convey by his ex-
tracts the same knowledge contained in that
from which the compilation is made.3 3 Mr..
Justice Shipman, in Banks v. McDivitt,3 1 has
examined very fully the rights of compilers
of books which are not original in their char-
acter, the compilations being of facts from
common and universal sources of informa-
tion, such as are contained in directories,
digests, guide books, maps and statistical
tables. While the compiler of such a book
does not have a monopoly of the subject of
which the book treats, any other person being
free to make a similar book, yet the subse-
quent investigator must investigate for him-
self, from the original sources open to all.
He will not be allowed to use the labors of
the previous compiler, saving his own time
by copying the results of the previous com-
piler's study. "The compiler af a digest, a
road book, a directory, or a map," says
Judge Shipman, "can search and survey for
himself in the fields which all laborers are
permitted to occupy, but he can not
30 Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100.
31 Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne I& Craig, 711,736;
Bromhall v. Halcombe, ib. 737, 738.
82 Copinger on Copyright, 37.
33 Story's Executors v. lolcombe, 4 McLean, 806..
84 13 Blatchford, 163.
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adopt as his own, the products of another's
toil.",35
Doubt existed for a long time whether one
could have rights of property, copyright, in
translations-whether the mere act of giving
to a literary composition the new dress of
another language, added to the case an ele-
ment which ought to take it out of the rule
by which reproductions in other forms are
prohibited. It is now settled that a man has
a right to copyright a translation.
36
If a foreigner translates an English work,
and then the foreign work is xe-translated
into English, it is an infringement of the
original copyright. 3' And in Stowe v.
Thomas, 38 it is said that to translate a work
is no infringement of the copyright, although
the author has previously had it translated
into the same language, and secured a copy-
right for that translation.
A reviewer may be guilty of an infringe-
ment of the copyright of the author of the
book reviewed. "The extracts must not be
made too freely. Sufficient may be taken to
form a correct idea of the whole; but no one
is allowed, under the pretense of quoting, to
publish either the whole or the principal part
of another man's composition; and, there-
fore, a review must not serve as a substitute
for the book reviewed. If so much be ex-
tracted that the article communicates the
same knowledge as the original work, it is an
actionable violation of literary propei ty."39
A reporter has a copyright in his marginal
notes, and in the argumente of counsel as
prepared and arranged by him, though he has
none in the opinions of the c6urt. 4° Ab-
35 See, also, Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K. & J. 708;
Kelley v. Morris, L. R. 1 Eq. 697; Scott v. Stan-
ford, L. R. 3 Eq. 718; Lewis v. Fullerton, 2
Beaver, 6; Holten v. Arthur, 1 Hemming & Miller,
603; Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Vesey, 215; Matthewson v.
Stockdale, 12 Vesey, 270; Longman v. Winchester, 16
Vesey, 269; Gray v. Russell, I Story, 11; Folsom v.
Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story, 768.
3 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 23, 48; Barnet v. Chet-
wood, 2 Mer. 441; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G.
& S. 693; Wyatt v. Barnard, 3 Ves. & B. 77; Emerson
v. Davies, 3 Story 768, 780; Shook v. Rankin, 6 Bis-
sell, 480.
37 Murray v. Bogue, 17 Jur. 219; 1 Drew, 353.
38 2 Wallace, Jr., 547.
89 Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 306;
Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 106; Rowarth v. Wilkes, 1
Campbell, 94, 97; Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Vesey, 422;
Cary v. Kearsley, 5 Esp. N. P. 170.
40 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; Gray v. Russell, 1
Story, 11.
stracts of title are subjects of copyright 41
A sheet of music is a subject of copyright,
42
but a newspaper is not. 43 The author of a
libelous or immoral work can not maintain
an action against any person for publishing a
pirated edition of such work.44 And Con-
gress could not pass a law conferring the
privilege of copyright upon immoral or in-
decent works.
45
Whatever right in the nature of copyright
exists in this country, is created by, and ex-
ists only to the extent and upon the condi-
tions specified in the acts of Congress, but
relief from infringements is to be sought in
the State courts, unless the residence of the
parties in different States confers jurisdiction
upon the Federl Cou~ts.4 6 Publication and
delivery to the librarian of Congress of two
copies of the work sought to be copyrighted,
is as much a condition to the creation of a
valid copyright, as is the filing a copy of the
title page; and a bill to restrain an infringe-
ment is said to be demurrable, unless it avers
performance of both these conditins- 7
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
ADULTERATION OF FOOD AND DRUGS.
"What a contrast between now and, say, only a
hundred years ago! At that later date, or still
more conspicuously for ages before that, all
England awoke to its work with an invocation to
an Eternal Maker to bless them in their day's
labor, and help them to do it well. Now, all
England, shopkeepers, workmen, and all manner
of competing laborers, awaken as with an unspo-
kcn but heartfelt prayer to Beelzebub :-Oh, help
us, thou great lord of shoddy, adulteration and
malfeasance, to do our work with the maximum
of slimness, swiftness, profit and mendacity, for
the devil's sake, and an amen." So wrote the
pungent pen of the late Thomas Carlyle; while
Mr. Ruskin, less indisputably, will have it that "it
is merely through the quite bestial ignorance of
the moral law in which the English bishops have
41 Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn. 94.
42 Clementi v. uolding, 2 Camp. 25; Clayton v.
Stone, 2 Paine, 382.
43 Clayton v. Stone, supra.
44 Stockdale v. Onwliyn, 11 Eng. C. L. 191; Hirne v.
Dale, 2 Camp. 27, note b.; Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp.
97; Gale v. Leckie, 2 Starkie, 107; Lawrence v. Smith,
1 Jac. 471.
45 Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchford, 256.
40 Boucicault v. Hart. 13 Blatchford, 47.
47 Parckinson v. Laselle, 3 Sawyer, 330.
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